troversies that followed. We wish here to mention what we feel is an important point arising from their discussion, and use this to highlight some interesting features of using directed acyclic graphs (DAGs) to discuss issues relating to selection bias and missing data.
The non-hospitalized subpopulation Figure 1b) , where two independent diseases are found to be associated in hospitalized patients, 'one would not expect a spurious association between [two diseases] in a study restricted to non-hospitalized patients.' In Snoep Figure 2 , a patient is not hospitalized (H ¼ 0) if and only if she is not hospitalized for disease 1 (H1 ¼ 0) and not hospitalized for disease 2 (H2 ¼ 0); a patient is hospitalized (H ¼ 1) if she is hospitalized for disease 1 (H1 ¼ 1) or hospitalized for disease 2 (H2 ¼ 1). Restricting to nonhospitalized patients therefore implies jointly conditioning on H1 ¼ 0 and H2 ¼ 0, whereas restricting to hospitalized patients does not imply such joint conditioning; in this scenario, the disease-specific hospitalization variables are not colliders, and thus the collider-stratification bias suggested by Snoep Figure 1b when conditioning on H ¼ 0 cannot be present. The authors numerically demonstrate the lack of spurious association in the non-hospitalized population in the Appendix of their paper.
We agree with these results and the accompanying explanation, but wish to make additional points, including some most relevant to the application of these diagrams to cohort rather than case-control settings. Restriction of an analysis by a variable affected by both the exposure and outcome (such as in Snoep Figure 1b , with D1 considered an exposure) does not require a case-control setting, but the application of Snoep et al.'s work directly to cohort studies may lead to bias. First we note that the equality of the odds ratio in the non-hospitalized and full populations does not extend to the proportion of cases (in other contexts, the overall risk of the disease in the overall population); nor does it generally extend to estimation of effects more relevant to cohort settings (e.g. risk difference, risk ratio) when those effects are non-null.
Regarding the proportion of cases, note that in Table 2a by Snoep et al. , the proportion of cases in the overall population is (100000/1090000 ¼) 0.092; in the hospitalized population, (7319/208,883 ¼) 0.035; and in the nonhospitalized population, (92681/881117 ¼) 0.105: the proportion of cases is different in the overall and nonhospitalized populations. We will address the intuition for this below.
Regarding non-null effects, assume in Snoep Figure 2 that D1 has a non-null effect on D2 in the total population: draw an arrow from D1 to D2, as in our Figure 1 . Effects will still be estimated with bias in the hospitalized population. However, under these conditions, the risk difference and risk ratio will be biased in the non-hospitalized population also. Intuitively, the bias can be seen in our Figure 1 . 3, 4 Conditioning on H ¼ 0 (equivalently H1 ¼ 0 and H2 ¼ 0) induces an association between D1 and all other causes of D2 (labelled U), since U and D1 share a child (D2), a descendant of which (H2) is in the conditioning set. It is this induced spurious association (between U and D1) that changes the estimated effect of D1 on D2. A similar effect will occur if the association between D1 and D2 is due to a common cause (e.g. erase the arrow between D1 and D2, and add C with arrows to both D1 and D2). Equivalent arguments apply if D1 is replaced with an exposure state, and our Association with cholecystic disease in the overall population; the odds ratio is 2.45, the risk ratio is 2.24, the risk difference is 0.082. 2 .) This DAG explains that spurious associations may arise in a study outside the hospital if there is a causal effect of D1 on D2. Conditioning on H ¼ 0 implies conditioning on H1 and H2, which leads to a spurious association between D1 and D2 through U. In a cohort setting, one can replace D1 with an exposure; and H1 and H2 can be regarded as exposure-and disease-specific selection into the study (or analysis). Figure 1 DAG is transplanted to a cohort setting. In either a cohort or case-control setting, the odds ratio is a special parametric case; since DAGs are non-parametric, such special cases cannot be detected from a DAG. Since case-control studies are typically analysed using only odds ratios, this bias typically does not arise in case-control settings. A numerical demonstration of this latter point is given in Tables 1-2c below, mimicking Tables 1-2c in Snoep et al. but modified so that there is a non-null association between D1 and D2 in the original population. Table footnotes contain the odds ratio (appropriate to the case-control setting) as well as risk difference and risk ratio measures (appropriate in the case where our Figure 1 is translated to a cohort setting, with D1 replaced by E).
This highlights an important difference between using DAGs to decide whether the effect of an exposure on an outcome can be estimated free from confounding bias, and using DAGs to decide whether a particular effect (or association) is biased if we restrict the analysis to a particular sub-population. 3 In the former setting, it is sufficient to find that, given a subset of variables Z, exposure and outcome would be conditionally independent in the absence of a causal effect. In the latter setting, in the absence of a causal effect (or any other population association) of D1 on D2, these variables are indeed independent in the non-hospitalized sub-population, as Snoep et al. have shown. However, a sufficient condition for the parameters of any regression model to be consistently estimated using data only on a subset (S ¼ 1) is that S should be conditionally independent of the outcome in that regression model given the covariates in the model. 3, 5 This condition can be checked in a DAG and is seen not to hold in Snoep Figures 1b or 2, nor our Figure 1 . This explains the bias in the 'intercept'-that is, the overall probability of case status-at the null, and in effect measures other than odds ratios away from the null.
Implications for a complete records analysis
The paper by Snoep et al., like Berkson's original paper, is of interest more widely than simply in the context of hospitalization. Whenever data on variables to be included in an analysis may be missing, and a complete records analysis is considered, these issues arise. 6 In this simple approach to dealing with incomplete data, an individual contributes to the analysis if and only if she has all relevant data observed. When missingness can occur in many variables, we can think of having an incomplete record as being akin to being hospitalized, which can occur for different reasons. Thus a complete records analysis is akin to restricting the analysis to those not hospitalized (although the possibility that the value of one variable influences missingness in another then becomes very plausible; this is analogous to D1 affecting H2 and D2 affecting H1 in Snoep Figure 2 ). Consider a case-control study in which temporal ordering of exposure and outcome are known. Although such a study might be prey to numerous biases, including confounding and selection bias, nonetheless such a design could reasonably target a causal parameter. In such a study, outcome affects selection into study by design, whereas exposure could affect selection into analysis under numerous circumstances (diagnostic testing fails to return an unambiguous response at a rate depending on true exposure status). Such a study would then echo the causal structure suggested in Snoep Figure 1b (with an arrow from exposure to outcome), and indeed could plausibly also match that of Snoep Figure 2 (again with an arrow from exposure to outcome). If this were the case, the odds ratio would remain unbiased even if the analysis were restricted to subjects with the exposure observed; we believe that this fact is not generally well known. One can imagine prospective cohort studies as well, in which data are missing or selected into analysis based on values of the exposure and outcome.
Although one might reasonably argue that such situations are relatively rare, we would nonetheless push back-gently-against the contention of Snoep et al. that 'the only type of Berkson's fallacy that matters is the indirect form' (emphasis added). That said, the indirect versions of Berkson's fallacy certainly seem more likely to occur in practice, and the reintroduction and clear explanation of the varieties of the indirect fallacy in Snoep et al. is a service to the science.
